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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is taken from the order dismissing Appellants Louis and Patricia Caravella 
("Caravellas") counterclaims for fraud and misrepresentation, as contained in the district court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and order of dismissal, and resulting judgment entered by 
the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District in Teton County following a full trial, with the 
court acting as finder of fact. This consolidated lawsuit originated as two separate actions seeking 
to foreclose mechanics liens filed by Respondent Frontier Development Group, LLC ("FDG") and 
Yellowstone Do It Center, LLC ("Yellowstone"). Yellowstone is not involved in this appeal. Both 
actions related to work and materials allegedly provided on the construction of a home (the "Home" 
or the "Property") for the Caravellas. The Caravellas counter-claimed against FDG and 
Yellowstone, and joined Respondent Michael Horn ("Horn"), the principal owner/manager ofFDG, 
as a counter-defendant. The Caravellas sought damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, 
construction defects, consumer protection violations, slander of title and fraud. Following trial, the 
district court dismissed both FDG's and Yellowstone's lien claims, and awarded damages, fees and 
costs to the Caravellas against FDG in the total amount of$245,525, and against Yellowstone in the 
amount of $29,865. The district court did not, however, award any damages against Horn 
personally. (R. Vol. II P. 387.) 
The primary issues on appeal address fraud and the personal liability of Horn. Appellants 
respectfully submit that the district court failed to properly apply its own findings of fact when it 
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concluded that Caravellas proved only eight of the nine elements of fraud, failing only to prove that 
Hom knew his statements were false. Appellants further assert that the district court also erred in 
failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable as an agent for an undisclosed principal because 
he failed to disclose that he was acting for FDG before or at the time he contracted with the 
Caravellas, and also that Hom is liable as the alter ego ofFDG. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
1. FDG filed its Complaint for foreclosure on February 20,2009. (R. Vol. I, P. 1.) 
2. The Caravellas filed their Answer and Counterclaim to FDG' s Complaint, and joined 
Hom as a counterdefendant on April 6, 2009, seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach ofthe Consumer Protection Act, slander of 
title, and misrepresentation. CR. Vol. I, P. 5.) 
3. Yellowstone filed its Complaint for foreclosure on June 1,2009. 
4. The cases were consolidated on December 1,2009. 
5. Caravellas filed their Answer to Yellowstone's Complaint on January 29,2010. 
6. Caravellas filed an Amended Counterclaim on October 19,2010, seeking damages 
from Hom and FDG for breaches of contract, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
Consumer Protection Act, and the warranty of habitability, as well as slander of title, fraud and 
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy; Caravellas sought damages from Yellowstone for slander 
of title, civil conspiracy and negligence. CR. Vol. I, P. 122.) 
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7. HornlFDG and Yellowstone filed their Answer to the Amended Counterclaim on 
November 12,2010, and an Amended Answer to Amended Counterclaim on November 18,2010. 
CR. Vol. I, P. 136, 143.) 
8. The trial was held December 13-16,2011, with the court acting as finder of fact. 
9. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 29, 2012. (R. 
Vol. II, P. 316.)1 
10. On October 31,2012, the Court entered an Order and Final Judgment awarding 
attorney fees, cost and prejudgment interest to the Caravellas against FDG in the total amount of 
$245,525, and against Yellowstone in the total amount of$29 ,865. Caravellas' claims against Horn 
personally were dismissed. (R. Vol. II, P. 368,386.) 
11. Caravellas filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12,2012. CR. Vol. II, P. 389.) 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded that the Caravellas 
failed to prove Horn/FDG's knowledge ofthe falsity of various misrepresentations. However, the 
district court's own findings offact and other evidence in the Record demonstrate that the Caravellas 
in fact proved the scienter element of fraud. 
I Subsequent references to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will refer to 
either the "Findings #" or "Conclusions #", and the page number where it can be found in 
Volume II of the Clerk's Record. 
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1. Facts Regarding the "Condition, Quality and Value of the Home and 
Workmanship of the Construction Performed on the Home Before 
[Caravellas] Purchased It," and Demonstrating Horn's Overall Intent to 
Misrepresent Facts. 
ill March, 2008, the Caravellas resided in Ohio and were looking to purchase a horne in Teton 
Valley for their retirement. The Caravellas' real estate agent, Mark Griese, told them about the 
partially constructed Horne (the subject of this lawsuit), which was being listed by another agent in 
his office, Kathleen Horn. (Findings #26, p. 324-25.) The Horne had been under construction by 
her husband, Michael Horn. The Horne was about half completed before the original owner, Richard 
Myers ("Myers), encountered financial difficulty and declared bankruptcy. (Findings #6-8, p. 319.) 
Myers' lender, First Horizon Horne Loans ("First Horizon"), had initiated foreclosure proceedings 
on the Property when the Caravel1as became interested in purchasing it. (Findings #9, 26, p. 319.) 
Horn's dealings with Myers and First Horizon demonstrate his overall fraudulent intent and 
disregard for the truth. During the time when Horn/FOG was constructing the Horne for Myers, 
HornJFDG submitted pay requests to First Horizon and was paid a total of$656, 173. (Findings # 12, 
p. 320.) With each pay request, Horn certified that the improvements for which payment was sought 
had been "completed as per the 'Plans and Specifications' ... except for the 'Change Orders' listed 
below," and that all bills from the previous draw had been paid. (Findings #10-12, p. 320-21.) 
Nevertheless, there were several substantial items of work for which Horn was paid in full 
after certifying that they were complete, but which were neither installed nor found on the Property 
when the Caravellas later purchased the Horne, (Findings #13-25, p. 321-323), including the 
following: 
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a. $10,879 for siding materials, (Findings #13-18, p. 321-22); 
b. $5,725 for staining 19,744 linear feet of siding and exterior trim, (Jd.); 
c. $15,000 for 100% of the required soffit and facia, (!d.); 
d. $3,500 for a propane tank, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #19); 
e. $5,000 for steel beams, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #20); 
f. $5,000 for fireplace inserts, (Findings #21); 
g. $24,000 for a septic tank and well, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #22); 
h. $14,397.98 for cabinets, (Findings #23); and 
I. $3,500 for roof flashing, certified as 100% completed, (Findings #24). 
Thus, more than $87,000 worth of labor or materials were never performed or installed, 
despite Hom's multiple certifications under oath that the work was completed and his receipt offull 
payment for such actually incomplete work. Accordingly, the amount of work and materials that 
were actually completed on the Home was no more than $570,000, and perhaps less. 
When construction was halted for Myers in March 2007, significant framing issues remained, 
including an incomplete roof, exposed door openings, exposed window openings and incomplete 
structural framing. Thus, the Home was left exposed to snow, rain, sun and wind for at least 
fourteen months. (Findings #8, p. 319.) 
When the Caravellas later became interested in the Property, nearly all of the 
communications with Hom were conducted via email, all of which were admitted as evidence at 
trial. (Findings #27, p. 324; Hom testimony, Tr. Vol. I., p. 402, L. 12-21; Defs Exhibits A-E; PI's 
Exhibits 9-18.) In their initial contacts, Hom advised the Caravellas that the Property had been 
"sitting untouched for over a year." (Findings #27.) Hom also advised the Caravellas that First 
Horizon would not sell the Property for less than $800,000. (!d.) Hom represented to the Caravellas 
"that the value of the property was $1.2 million dollars, with $800,000 worth of construction 
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completed and the lot having a value of $400,000." (Findings #28.) Caravellas submit that it was 
impossible for Horn not to have known he had truly performed at most $570,000 worth of 
construction on the Home, as explained above. Thus, Caravellas were led to believe a substantially 
greater proportion of construction had been completed towards finishing a $1.2 million project. 
Horn also "represented his skills as a builder in 'superlative terms, '" and he told the 
Caravellas that he was "one of the best builders, if not the best," in Teton Valley. "He told them that 
regarding home interiors, 'many have tried' to match his interior work, 'but all have failed. '" 
(Findings #29, p. 324.) In an email sent to the Caravellas on March 21,2008, Horn represented that 
"[m]y personal cabinet maker sets up shop in your garage .... NO other builder can touch my 
cabinets and my guy only works for me." (March 21 email, Ex. D, p. 6-7.) At trial, however, Horn 
admitted that other than two homes he built for himself, one of which was a in Utah, he had only 
been involved with building eight other homes, all of which were constructed between 2006 and 
2009, and that Myers' house was only the third or fourth. (Findings #157-60, p. 346; Tr. Vol I, p. 
373,375-77,411-12.) Moreover, "Horn testified that he has no actual hands-on construction skills. 
He has not performed concrete, framing, HVAC, electrical, or any other construction work." 
(Findings #30, p. 324.) All of the actual work on the homes he "built" was actually performed by 
subcontractors, (Findings # 159, p. 346), which would necessarily include the interior work that "all 
have failed" to match. Certainly, Horn could not have believed that the best cabinet maker in the 
area worked solely for someone who only built 8 houses, nor that the subcontractors who actually 
performed such praiseworthy interior work could somehow not duplicate it in other homes. 
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Also during their early email correspondence, discussing the cost of construction, "Horn 
informed the Caravellas that 'Chase's' construction loan rates were the best, but not ifthe loan was 
for a 'second' home." (Findings #31, p. 325.) Horn recommended that the Caravellas make false 
representations to "Chase" bank to secure the best available financing. He advised that the 
Caravellas should "apply for the loan and initially represent that they were trying to sell their existing 
home, so that they could obtain the most favorable financing. They were then advised to 'change 
[their] mind' about selling their first home when the construction was completed." (Jd.) This type 
of advice is indicative of Horn's character and general disregard for the truth? 
"Mr. Caravella testified that he relied upon Horn's statements concerning his skills as a 
builder. He testified that Horn's persuasive assurances and statements about his skills and experience 
caused them to trust him and to rely upon his representations." (Findings #32, p. 325.) In contrast 
to Horn's bold claims about his skills, the district court found that Horn was incompetent as a 
general contractorlbuilder. (Conclusions #47, p. 356, and #44, p. 355.) 
The district court found that "[b ]ased on the information the Caravellas received from Horn 
about the home," they offered to purchase the property from Myers in early April, 2008. (Findings 
#33-34, p. 325.) Less than two hours after the Caravellas accepted a counteroffer from Myers, whose 
real estate agent was Horn's wife, "Horn recorded a new mechanics lien for $23,000 against the 
property on behalf ofFDG." (Findings #36, p. 325.) According to Horn's testimony, the basis for 
2 It should be noted that the Caravellas rejected Horn's advice. They proceeded with 
construction without a loan, on a cash-available basis. 
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the lien was a temporary handrail installed in the Home, as well as unpaid old work performed for 
Myers. (Findings #37, p. 325; Tr. Vol. I, p. 477.) Hom's self-serving assertions are wholly 
contradicted by his own representations to the Caravellas that the Home had sat untouched for over 
a year. (Findings #27, p. 324.) The obviously unfounded and wrongfullien3 was paid in full when 
Caravellas closed on the Property. (Findings #37, p. 325.) 
Pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement with Myers, the Caravellas had the opportunity 
to inspect the Property and terminate the agreement. (PI's Exhibit 3, p. 2.) In late April 2008, the 
Caravellas traveled from Ohio to Teton Valley to meet with Hom and inspect the Property. They 
reviewed detailed drawings ofthe house plans with Hom, and met with him on two consecutive days 
to review and inspect the Property. (Findings #38, p 325-26.) "The Caravellas testified that Hom 
pointed out just two interior framing/structural issue during his inspection ofthe property: a missing 
support post and an inadequate structural beam. Hom told them that the beam would need to be 
enhanced." (Findings #41, p. 326.) "Hom advised the Caravellas that certain structural, framing and 
leaking issues needed to be remedied as soon as possible. Mrs. Caravella testified that while she had 
concerns about water intrusion into the house, Hom minimized the problems and told the Caravellas 
the Home was 'in good shape,' 'structurally sound' and a 'great house. ", (Findings #42, p. 326; see 
also Findings #69, p. 331.) Hom did not disclose any other deficiencies in the construction of the 
Home, (Findings #70, p.331), nor did he disclose the fact that he had "modified the written plans for 
3 Idaho Code § 45-507 requires filing a lien with 90 days of completion of the last work. 
Hom's last work was more than a year previous. 
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the roofwithout an architect or engineer's involvement." (Findings #108, p. 338.) The modification 
was ultimately found to be defective and required repair/correction to stop leaking. (Jd.) 
The district court ultimately concluded that in purchasing the Property "the Caravellas relied 
heavily upon Hom's representations as to the condition of the Home. In lieu of bringing in an outside 
inspector, Caravellas relied upon the builder [Hom] who would be completing the home to confirm 
its condition. . .. Hom knew that Caravellas were relying upon his assessment of the home's 
condition." (Conclusions #37, p. 354.) 
2. Additional Facts Regarding Progress and Quality of the Work 
Performed By Horn/FDG Pursuant to the Contract 
The Caravellas and Hom agreed "that the home would be constructed in accordance with the 
original written plans, subject to Caravellas' requested changes." They further agreed that the Home 
would be completed in phases, and that a new phase would not be approved until the previous phase 
was complete and the Caravellas confirmed that they had sufficient funds. The goal ofthe first phase 
was to shore up all structural defects and get the exterior enclosed before winter. (Findings #55 and 
57, p. 328-29.) 
The total contract price for the work authorized by the Caravellas on the Home for the first 
phase was $88,500, itemized as follows: 
a. Exterior stone, structural framing and roof ridge vents: $50,000; 
b. Exterior wrap, siding and stain: $35,000; 
c. Exterior plumbing and electrical rough-ins: $2,500; 
d. Two additional windows: $1,000; and 
e. Additional stone on the utility room: no additional cost. 
(Findings #61, p. 329; see also Findings # 58 and 60.) 
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At various times throughout the project for CaraveIlas, as he had done when building for 
Myers, Hom misrepresented to the Caravellas that major, critical portions of the work had been 
completed according to the plans when, in fact, such work was neither completed nor did it conform 
to the plans. Those items include the exterior stone work, (Findings #66, p. 330; #111-12, p. 338-
39); the exterior siding, (Findings #72-73, p. 331); garage and "bam" doors, (Findings #82-83, p. 
333); and ridge vents and flashing on the roof, (Findings #71, p. 331). Hom also had identified two 
specific structural framing issues, which he advised needed to be completed "ASAP," but he never 
had any work done on either structural issue. (Findings #69-70, p. 331.) 
Not only did Hom fail to complete these items of contracted work, he billed the Caravellas 
far in excess of the full contract price for those items. (Findings #65 and 72.) Moreover, the work 
was found to be replete with serious, latent construction defects, (Findings #395-110, p. 335-38), 
including some that created "life safety issues," (Findings #103, p. 337). 
3. Additional Facts Regarding "the Cost of Materials Used in the 
Construction" 
The district court specifically found that "FDG and Horn's prior dealings with Myers and 
First Horizon also showed a pattern ofbiIling for materials that were never used in constructing the 
home." (Findings #137, p. 343) (emphasis added). HornlFDG continued this pattern in billing the 
Caravellas. 
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of $86,500 ... for the exterior stonework, fixing the 
structural framing, and fixing the leaking roof/ridge vents, which are the tasks he had agreed to 
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complete for $50,000," despite the fact that he never actually completed the work. (Findings #65-71, 
p.330-31.) 
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of$74,350 (labor, materials and contractor fee) for siding, 
which he had agreed to complete for $35,000," again, despite the fact that the work was not even 
completed, (Findings #72-73, p. 331; #146, p. 344). Hom and Yellowstone billed Caravellas for 
"nearly six times the amount of soffit material than was necessary to complete the job," (Findings 
#114 and 137-38, p. 339 and 343); between two and five times the amount necessary for various 
sizes of window trim, (Findings 116-17); twice as much Tyvek building wrap than was necessary, 
(Findings # 119); and nearly double the amount of cedar siding required for the entire exterior of the 
Home, (Findings #121, p. 343.) Horn/FDG previously had been paid over $30,000 from First 
Horizon for these (uninstalled) items. (Findings #13-18, p. 321-22.) 
"Hom billed the Caravellas a total of$29,040.89 for installed 'Garage & Bam Doors.' It is 
undisputed that only the three garage doors were ever installed -the bam doors were never installed. 
The Court finds that Hom's bill to the Caravellas erroneously included the uninstalled bam doors." 
(Findings #82, p. 333.) "FDG overbilled the Caravellas by $12,645.89 for the garage doors." 
(Findings #83, p. 333.) 
Even though the agreed price for phase one of the work was only $88,500, (Findings #61, 
p. 329), the Caravellas ultimately paid Horn/FDG a total of $138,097.24 "fur the work that Hom 
represented had been done on the property," but which was never actually completed. (Findings 
#126-27, p. 341.) This amount included payments for additional, unauthorized work, including 
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$19,900 for concrete work that was both defective and poured in the wrong location, (Conclusions 
#32, p. 353), and the garage and bam doors for which Caravellas were overbilled. The district court 
expressly found that "[i]n addition to the work that was not authorized, FDG also billed the 
Caravellas for completion of all the stonework, all the siding, and repair ofthe structural issues, none 
of which were actually completed." (Findings #147, p. 345.) 
Unbeknownst to the Caravellas, Hom and Yellowstone had agreed that Yellowstone's bill 
would be paid last. After Caravellas stopped Hom's work-after having already overpaid the 
contract price- Yellowstone claimed an additional amount owed of over $75,000 and recorded a 
lien on the Property. (Findings #136 and 139, p. 343.) Hom also claimed the Caravellas still owed 
him about $30,000 in addition to what had already been paid. (Findings #141, p. 344.) 
The district court expressly found that "HornJFDG and Yellowstone should have known that 
they substantially overbilled the Caravellas for the work and materials actually provided," that they 
"displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted accounting and inventory control procedures," and that 
they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their sworn statements" regarding 
the work and materials actually provided to the Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) The Court 
further concluded that HornJFDG "should have known that it had already received full payment from 
the Caravellas pursuant to its contract with them .. " HornJFDG and Yellowstone's actions in 
recording their liens were clearly reckless, erroneous, and wrongful." (Conclusions #56, p. 358.) 
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4. Facts Regarding the Operation of FDG 
FDG is owned by Hom and his realtor wife, Kathleen. According to Hom's testimony, 
Kathleen owns a small percentage of ownership in FDG, but has no specific duties and does not 
participate in the business ofFDG. (Findings #156, p. 346.) Hom admitted that "FDG acts only 
through him, never hired any employees, did not own any assets at the time of trial, and that all of 
FDG's profits were taken by him as his personal income, although he does not receive any 
compensation as a manager or employee of FDG." (Findings #157, p. 346.) Hom testified that 
during the time FDG was involved with the Caravellas' construction, FDG owned two telescopic 
forklifts, (id.; Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, L. 24 through P. 911, L. 10.), but he did not produce any 
documentation to back up his claim. In his deposition, admitted into evidence as Exhibit DDDD, 
Hom testified that FDG owned only one forklift and no other assets. (Exhibit DDDD, Hom 
Deposition, P. 230, L. 11-19.) 
Both before and after contracting with the Caravellas to complete the construction of the 
Home, Hom communicated with the Caravellas primarily by email. (Findings # 161, p. 347. ) None 
ofthe numerous emails make any overt reference to FDG or its assumed business name, Open Range 
Homes. (See generally, Defendants' Exhibits A through E, and H through N.) The only connection 
to FDG in the emails is in the domain portion of the email address, which was 
"builder@openrangehomes.com." 
The district court believed Horn's testimony that there were signs at his job sites that referred 
to Open Range Homes. (Findings #45, p. 327.) The court found that "Caravellas should have seen 
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the signage at the job site" when they visited the Property. There was no evidence, however, 
regarding where the sign was placed, how big it was, or whether it was even legible after being out 
in the elements for nearly two years. (See, generally, Tr. Vol. I, P. 235-237.) The Caravellas 
testified that they did not see it. (Findings #45.) Hom did not present any evidence that he 
affirmatively disclosed his capacity as an agent for FDG or anyone other than himself. 
Hom repeatedly represented to the Caravellas that he was the one who had built other homes 
in the area and that he was the one who would perform work or would hire subcontractors to perform 
work on their house. For example, he stated: 
a. "[Myers] hired me to build the house ... ", (March 17 email, 
Ex. A, p. 3) (emphasis added); 
b. "I have one 6000 SF house under construction for a Seattle 
guy ... ", (Id.) (emphasis added); 
c. "[can fix just about anything with interior design .... Ml!. 
personal cabinet maker sets up shop in your garage .... NO 
other builder can touch mr. cabinets and !!.D!. guy only works 
for me." (March 21 email, Ex. D, p. 6-7) (emphases added); 
d. "Okay, mr. stone mason can start next week. . .. Once I get 
going, I will send you a drawing of where I think you might 
want to add more stone." (Ex. 22 p. 2) (emphasis added); 
e. "I normally bill on or about the 15th of each month .... " 
(May 16 email, Ex. D, bottom paragraph) (emphasis added). 
The first overt reference to FDG or Open Range Homes that was ever given to the Caravellas 
was an invoice from FDG dated May 19, 2008, for construction materials purchased for the Home. 
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(Ex. 89a). This obviously occurred after the contract was formed and work had begun on the Home. 
(See Ex. N (email regarding delivery of the materials on May 16, 2008).) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court erred in Concluding that Michael Hom did not know his 
material representations to the Caravellas were false. 
R Whether the District Court erred in failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable 
as the agent of an undisclosed principal. 
C. Whether the District Court erred in failing to conclude that Hom is personally liable 
for the judgment entered against FDG on the grounds of alter ego. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Caravellas request that this Court award them reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, as it arises from a 
commercial transaction and contract for services. The Caravellas hired HornJFDG in a "commercial 
transaction" to provide construction-related materials and services. Under section 12-120(3), the 
prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees in an action to recover on a contract "relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction." The 
Caravellas should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees on appeal because the gravamen ofthe 
fraud claims and the claims of Hom's personal liability arose from Hom's efforts to secure the 
contract to provide construction-related goods and services, his misrepresentations about such 
contract, and his performance of such contract. This matter is both a "commercial transaction," Lee 
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v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 189 P.3d 467 (2008), and a contract for services. See Brian & Christie, 
Inc. v. Leishman Electric, LLC, 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d 166 (2010) (holding that the economic loss 
rule does not apply to services contracts, and that electrician's work constitutes services, but fees 
were not sought on appeal under 12-120(3)). The construction contract is integral to the Caravellas' 
claims of fraud and to Horn's personal liability. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
"The party alleging intentional misrepresentation or fraud has the burden of proving the 
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence." Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 225, 46 
P.3d 518,521 (2002), citing G &M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 
(1991). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the finding." Sowards v. Rathbun, 
134 Idaho 702, 707,8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000); Lindberg, 137 Idaho at 225,46 P.3d at 521; Carney 
v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275,985 P.2d 1137 (1999). "This Court exercises free review over the district 
judge's conclusions oflaw." Id., citing Carneyv. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 278, 985 P.2d 1137,1140 
(1999), andMarshallv. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). "This Court's review 
of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact 
and whether the findings offact support the conclusions oflaw." Sowards, 134 Idaho at 706,8 P.3d 
at 1249. 
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In this case, most of the Caravellas' contentions of error are based on the district court's 
application of its own findings of fact to the conclusions of law. Therefore, the standard of review 
is de novo. The Caravellas submit that the district court's findings of fact and the Record support 
conclusions oflaw that Hom committed fraud and is personally liable to the Caravellas. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS DEMONSTRATE THAT CARA VELLAS 
PROVED THE SCIENTER ELEMENT OF FRAUD 
The Caravellas respectfully submit that the district court erred in failing to conclude that they 
proved all the elements of fraud. The prima facie case of fraud consists of: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it 
should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably 
contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance 
on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and 
proximate injury. 
Faw v, Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980) (emphasis added). Accord, 
e.g., Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449, 453 (2005); 
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 89, 996 P.2d 303, 308 (2000); and 
Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho 634, 635, 496 P.2d 95,96 (1972). 
The district court concluded that the Caravellas proved all but the fourth element of fraud, 
i.e., Horn/FDG's "knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth," with regard to the following 
categories of misrepresentations: 
a. the condition, quality and value of the Home and workmanship of the 
construction performed on the Home before they purchased it; 
b. the progress and quality of work FDG performed on the project 
pursuant to his contract with them; and 
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c. the cost of materials used in the construction. 
(R. Vol. II, P. 355, Conclusions #42) (emphases added).4 
The district court's conclusion that the Caravellas failed to prove Horn's knowledge of the 
falsity of his statements with regard to the three described types of misrepresentations is wholly at 
odds with the district court's express findings of fact. In other instances, the only reasonable 
conclusions that can be drawn from the district court's aggregate findings are either that it was 
impossible for Horn not to have known his representations were false or that he made statements of 
affirmative fact when he was "ignorant of its truth." Therefore, Caravellas respectfully request that 
this Court review de novo the application of the "found" facts to the Caravellas' fraud claims, and 
conclude that they have proven the final element of fraud and are entitled to judgment against FDG 
and Horn personally for fraud. 
1. Caravellas Proved that Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known that Horn's 
Statements Regarding the Value, Condition, Quality and Workmanship of the 
Home Prior to Purchase Were False. 
The district court correctly concluded that the Caravellas proved eight elements of fraud 
arising from HornlFDG' s misrepresentations about "the condition, quality and value ofthe home and 
workmanship of the construction performed on the home before they purchased it." (R. Vol. II, P. 
355, Conclusion #42 (a)) (emphases added). The district courterred,however, inconcludingthatthe 
4 There is no appeal or cross-appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that eight 
of the nine elements of fraud were proved. Therefore, the only issue on appeal with regard to 
fraud is whether the Caravellas also proved the scienter, or "speaker's knowledge," element. 
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Caravellas did not prove the fourth element of fraud, that misrepresentations were knowingly made, 
because such conclusion is belied by the court's findings of fact. 
a. Value of Home 
At the outset, Hom's prior dealings with Myers and First Horizon strongly demonstrate his 
general disregard for the truth and his intent to deceive those for whom he is working. (Findings 
#137, p. 343.) His early encouragement to the Caravellas that they defraud Chase bank is further 
evidence of his pattern of deceit. (Findings #31, p. 325.) 
It is impossible for Hom not to have known that he had been paid only $656,173 for the 
initial construction for Myers. It is equally impossible for him not to have known that the numerous, 
substantial items of work he certified as complete to Myers and First Horizon were never in fact 
incorporated into the Home's construction, and thus that the actual amount of funds actually used 
in the Home's construction was at least $87,000 less than he was paid, thus no more than $570,000. 
When the time came that the Caravellas were interested in the Property, Hom had a personal 
financial interest in the sale because his wife was the selling real estate agent. (Findings #26, p. 324-
25.) Also, it appears that Hom also intended to record his untimely, unfounded lien for $23,000, 
which was paid out of the closing funds. (Findings #36-37, p. 325.) In furtherance of his financial 
interests, Hom knowingly mis-represented to the Caravellas numerous times that "$800,000 worth 
of construction had been completed," nearly one and one-half (1 'ii) times the amount he knew had 
actually been completed. (Findings #28, p. 324.) 
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"[W]here actual value is known and false statements are knowingly made with intention to 
deceive, and do deceive the parties to whom they are made, such statements constitute actionable 
fraud. Such statements are not expressions of opinion but are statements of material facts." Jordan 
v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899,907 (Ct. App.1993), citingFoxv. Cosgrith, 66 Idaho 371,380,159 P.2d 
224, 227 (1945). "Thus, where a speaker gives an opinion when he is aware of facts incompatible 
with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false statement of fact if made with the intention of 
deceiving or misleading." !d., citing Fox, 66 Idaho at 380-81, 159 P.2d at 227-28; 37 Am. Jur. 2d 
Fraud and Deceit § 49. 
Caravellas respectfully submit that a correct application ofthe district court's own findings 
of fact mandates a conclusion that Horn was fully aware that he had misrepresented the actual value 
of the Property. Therefore, the Caravellas proved the fourth element of fraud with regard to this 
issue, for which the district court concluded they had proved the other eight elements of fraud. 
Because the Caravellas relied on Horn's misrepresentations in their decision to purchase the 
Property, (R. Vol. I, p. 325, Findings #33-34), they should be entitled to ajudgment for fraud against 
both Horn personally and FDG for all damages that flowed from such purchase. Those damages 
should include the eventual costs of repair, overbilling and attorney fees awarded by the district court 
against FDG, as well as the difference between Horn's representation ofthe amount of construction 
that had been completed and the actual amount of completed construction. 
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b. Condition & Quality of the Home, and Workmanship of Construction 
The district court rightly found that Hom had no actual experience performing any aspect of 
construction work, and the evidence clearly shows that he had very little experience even as a 
"hands-off' general contractor or construction manager of residential construction. Nevertheless, 
Hom took it upon himselfto inspect the partially-constructed home with the Caravellas, and "Hom 
knew that Caravellas were relying upon his assessment of the home's condition. " (Conclusions #37, 
p. 354.) In doing so, Hom minimized the problems in the Home and affirmatively represent to the 
Caravellas that, other than two specific structural issues, the Home was "structurally sound" and "in 
great shape." (Findings #41-42, p. 326.) The district court concluded that "the Caravellas relied 
heavily upon Hom's representations as to the condition of the home. In lieu of bringing in an outside 
inspector, Caravellas relied upon the builder [Hom] who would be completing the home to confirm 
its condition." (Conclusions #37, p. 354.) 
It is obvious from the nearly innumerable construction defects later found in the Home that 
Hom knew almost nothing about the workmanship, condition or quality of construction. Not having 
any actual experience or expertise, Hom had no business making affirmative representations to the 
Caravellas regarding any of those things. This is especially true in light of the fact that Hom had 
gone to great lengths to convince the Caravellas that he was actually a highly skilled, well respected 
builder. Of special concern is the fact that Hom, with his lack oftraining or experience, took it upon 
himselfto redesign a portion of the roof without any architect or engineering input. (Findings #108, 
p. 338.) Certainly, Hom knew there was at least the potential of a structural issue, but he failed to 
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disclose this fact to the Caravellas. Rather, he affinnativeiy represented that the Home was 
"structurally sound." 
The district court erroneously concluded that Hom did not intentionally deceive the 
Caravellas, but that he was merely incompetent. (Conclusions #44, p. 355.) To establish fraud, 
however, it is not necessary to show actual deceptive intent. "Circumstances inconsistent with an 
honest, reasonable belief in the truth of the statements, or indicating a reckless disregard for the 
truth" are sufficient to establish the scienter element offraud. Parker v. Herron, 30 Idaho 327, 331, 
164P.1013, 1014(1917). See also, e.g., General Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 
849, 854, 979 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1999) (in punitive damages context, describing "reckless 
indifference to the rights ofthe other party" as fraud). 
Decisions from federal courts are in accord with Idaho case law. "[T]he scienter requirement 
in the tort of misrepresentation generally has been interpreted to include recklessness." In re 
Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1978), citing W. Prosser, Torts, § 701 (4th Ed. 1971). 
"[I]ntent to deceive may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including reckless 
disregard for the truth." Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson, Fin. Corp. (In re Gertsch), 237 B.R. 160, 
167-68 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). Accord, National Union Fire Ins. Co., Pa. v. Bonnanzio (In re 
Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296,301 (2d Cir. 1996); Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27, 
30 (5th Cir. 1996); Insurance Co. of N Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 
1995); In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 305 (1Ith Cir. 1994); Martin v. Bank of Germantown (In re 
Martin), 761 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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At 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 120 (2012), it is explained that 
False statements that are made recklessly, without knowing or caring 
whether they are true or false, will support an action of fraud or 
deceit. Accordingly, the scienter or intent to deceive requirement, for 
purposes of a fraud claim, can be satisfied by a showing of 
recklessness. A representation is 'reckless' ifit is made without any 
knowledge of the truth, or if the person making the representation 
knows that he or she does not have sufficient information or a basis 
to support it, or if the maker realizes that he or she does not know 
whether or not the statement is true. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphases added). The pertinent section of the Restatement is consistent, 
explaining that misrepresentation is fraudulent ifthe maker "knows that he does not have the basis 
for his representation that he states or implies." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 526(c). 
Case law from other states consistently hold that an unqualified assertion of a fact susceptible 
of defendant's knowledge is regarded as an assertion of that knowledge, and is 
fraudulent ifthe defendant does not actually have such knowledge. Kirkpatrick v. Reeves, 22 N.B. 
139 (Ind. 1889); Smart & Perry Ford Sales, Inc. v. Weaver, 274N.E.2d 718 (Ind.App.1971);Bullitt 
v. Farrar, 43 N.W. 566 (Minn. 1889); Providence State Bank v. Bohannon, 426 F.Supp. 886 
(E.D.Mo.1977); Schlossman's v. Niewinski, 79 A.2d 870 (N.J. 1951); Manning v. Len Immke Buick, 
Inc., 276 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio App.1971); Liner v. Armstrong Homes o/Bremerton, Inc., 579 P.2d 367 
(Wash.App. 1978); First Nat. Banko/Tigerton v. Hackett, 149 N.W. 703 (Wis. 1914). 
37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit § 122 (2012), explains that matters of opinion, estimate, or 
judgment can support a finding of fraud. A person is gUilty of fraud if the speaker 
makes such a positive and unqualified statement as implies 
knowledge on the speaker's part, when in fact the speaker has no 
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knowledge on the subject ... if the statement proves to be false ... 
[and] where the assertion is in respect of a matter that is definitely 
ascertainable, as distinguished from a matter of opinion, estimate, or 
judgment. . .. [A]n opinion may constitute fraud if the speaker 
knows it is false. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). "[AJ representation recklessly made, without knowing whether or not it is 
true, cannot be a statement honestly believed but, on the contrary, is regarded as a false statement 
knowingly made." 37 AmJur2dFraudandDeceit§ 121 (20]2). 
Even if Horn was not fully aware of the actual poor condition, quality and workmanship of 
the Home, he knew or should have known that he had no reasonable basis to make any affirmations 
to the Caravellas regarding such condition, quality or workmanship of the Home. Again, Horn led 
the Caravellas to believe that he was highly skilled, garnered their trust in his expert opinion, and 
without any reasonable basis told them that the highly defective construction was in fact "sound" and 
"in good shape." 
The Caravellas proved facts, found by the district court, which demonstrate that Horn either 
knew his statements were false or, if not, he was "ignoran[t] of its truth." Faw v. Greenwood, 101 
Idaho at 389, 613 P.2d at 1340. Horn's indifference and reckless disregard for the actual truth 
requires a conclusion that he made misrepresentations to the Caravellas with "knowledge of its 
falsity or in ignorance of its truth." Id. Therefore, Caravellas should be entitled to a judgment for 
fraud against both Horn and FDG for all the damages that flowed from their purchase of the 
Property. Succinctly stated, the district court's findings of fact regarding Horn's representations 
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concerning his experience and competence as a builder, combined with his statements of fact 
regarding the quality and extent of construction establish the fourth element of fraud, i.e., scienter. 
2. Caravellas Proved that Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known That Horn's 
Statements Regarding the Progress and Quality of the Work Performed 
Pursuant to the Contract with Them Were False. 
The second type of misrepresentation for which the district court concluded the Caravellas 
had proved "eight out of nine elements offraud" concerned "the progress and quality of work FDG 
performed on the proj ect pursuant to his contract with them." (R. Vol. II, P. 355, Conclusion#42(b)) 
(emphasis added). 
"Insofar as the element of knowledge is concerned, false representations may be ground for 
relief where the person making them ought to know ... or the person has the means of knowing the 
truth. The rule applies even though the party making the statements does not know that they are 
false. . .. An innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means 
of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth." 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit 
§ 119 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
The district court expressly found that Hom represented to the Caravellas that major, critical 
portions of the work had been completed according to the plans when, in fact, such work was neither 
completed nor did it conform to the plans. Those items include the exterior stone work, (Findings 
#66, p. 330; #111-12, p. 338-39); the exterior siding, (Findings #72-73, p. 331); garage and "bam" 
doors, (Findings #82-83, p. 333); and ridge vents and flashing on the roof, (Findings #71, p. 331). 
Hom billed the Caravellas for more than the full agreed contract price for those items, which he 
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knew, or ought to have known, were not actually even completed. Certainly, Hom had the means 
of knowing or learning the truth, as the general contractor. Unlike the Caravellas, who were in Ohio 
and relying on Hom to perform the contract honestly, Hom lived only a few miles away from the 
jobsite. Hom was obligated to confirm that the work was completed before affirmatively 
representing to the Caravellas that it was complete, and an equal or greater obligation to confirm its 
completion before billing the Caravellas for the work. 
With regard to the slander of title claim, the district court expressly found that "HornlFDG 
and Yellowstone should have known that they substantially overbilled the Caravellas for the work 
and materials actually provided," that they "displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted accounting 
and inventory control procedures," and that they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth or 
falsity of their sworn statements" regarding the work and materials actually provided to the 
Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) Hom ought to have known that the work was actually 
incomplete, but misrepresented that fact to the Caravellas. As a result, the Caravellas continued to 
make payments to Hom, and even paid more than the contract price. 
The Caravellas respectfully submit that they should be awarded damages for fraud against 
both Hom and FDG, which should include their costs to repair and complete the work contracted 
by Hom, as well as the amounts they paid in excess of the contract price. 
3. Horn/FDG Knew or Should Have Known He Was Overbilling Caravellas for 
the Authorized Work Performed on the Home. 
The third type of misrepresentation for which the district court concluded the Caravellas had 
proved "eight out of nine elements of fraud" concerned "the cost of materials used in the 
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construction." (R. Vol. IT, P. 355, Conclusion #42(c).) This issue raises the same legal principals 
addressed above. 
The total contract price was only $88,500, but the Caravellas were billed, and paid, 
$138,097.24. (Findings #131, p. 342.) Even ifthe unauthorized concrete ($19,900), garage doors 
($16,395), and other allowed charges were added to the contract price, the very most the Caravellas 
possibly owed to HornlFDG was $126,646.79. (Id.) Again, the Court expressly concluded that 
"HornlFDG and Yellowstone should have known that they substantially overbilled the Caravellas 
for the work and materials actually provided," that they "displayed a cavalier indifference to accepted 
accounting and inventory control procedures," and that they "demonstrated a reckless disregard for 
the truth or falsity oftheir sworn statements" regarding the work and materials actually provided to 
the Caravellas. (Conclusions #55, p. 358.) The fact that HornlFDG recorded a mechanics lien for 
an additional amount claimed due in excess of$1 05,000 further demonstrates Hom's utter disregard 
for the truth regarding his billing. Additionally, the district court specifically found that "FDG and 
Hom's prior dealings with Myers and First Horizon also showed a pattern of billing for materials 
that were never used in constructing the home." (Findings # 13 7, p. 343.) It was impossible for Hom 
not to have known that Caravellas were being billed over $243,000 for work he had agreed to 
perform for $88,500, an increase of nearly three times the contract price. 
The referenced findings of facts and related conclusions oflaw are wholly inconsistent with 
a conclusion that the Caravellas failed to prove the scienter element of fraud, i.e., Hom's "knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth," with regard to overbilling. Faw, 101 Idaho at 389,613 P.2d 
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at 1340. "Circumstances inconsistent with an honest, reasonable beliefin the truth ofthe statements, 
or indicating a reckless disregard {or the truth" are sufficient to establish the scienter element of 
fraud. Parker, 30 Idaho at 331,164 P. at 1014 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., GeneralAuto Parts 
Co., 132 Idaho at 854, 979 P.2d at 1212 (in punitive damages context, describing "reckless 
indifference to the rights of the other party" as fraud). Certainly, Hom's prior conduct with respect 
to Myers and First Horizon, which the district court expressly found to show "a pattern of billing for 
materials that were never used," (Findings #137, p. 343), is evidence of motive and intent State v. 
Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 128,483 P.2d 173, 176 (1971). 
Caravellas respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's dismissal of the 
fraud claims and order entry of a judgment in favor of the Caravellas for all damages flowing from 
Hom's fraudulent conduct. Ultimately, Hom's fraudulent conduct gave rise to all ofthe Caravellas' 
damages incurred as a result of their purchase of the Home and hiring of Hom to complete the 
construction. 
C. HORN IS PERSONALLY LIABLE BECAUSE HE ENTERED THE CONTRACT 
WITH CARA VELLAS AS THE AGENT FOR AN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL 
The district court believed that Hom's personal liability was "admittedly a close question" 
that the Court "wrestled with for some time." (Findings #163, p. 347.) Nevertheless, the district 
court concluded that Hom did not "actively [attempt] to conceal FDG's role" from the Caravellas, 
(Findings #163, p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359), and that "the e-mail address (used on all 
correspondence), the signage on the job site, and the letterhead on the invoices, adequately evidenced 
FDG's role in this transaction." (/d.) 
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"It is a basic principle that an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but 
who neither discloses his agency nor the existence of that corporation to the third party, is personally 
liable to the third party." McCluskey Commissary, Inc. v. Sullivan, 96 Idaho 91, 93, 524 P.2d 1063, 
1065 (1974). "A principal is 'disclosed' if, at the time of making the contract in question, the other 
party to it has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the principal's identity." General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691,697,535 P.2d 664,670 (1975) 
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals applied the holding from General Motors to conclude that 
"[a]n agent contracting with someone else is liable as a party to the contract unless he discloses, at 
or before the time of entering into the contract, the agency relationship and the identity of the 
principal." Western Seeds v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 71, 704 P.2d 974, 975 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis 
added). 5 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, both the agent and his principal are liable 
parties to the contract if the principal is not disclosed before the contract is made: 
When an agent acting with actual authority makes a contract on 
behalf of an undisclosed principal, 
(1) unless excluded by the contract, the principal is a party to 
the contract; 
(2) the agent and the third party are parties to the contract; and 
(3) the principal, if a party to the contract, and the third party 
have the same rights, liabilities, and defenses against each 
5 "Similarly, a person contracting with another for a partially disclosed principal is liable 
as a party to the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975, citing Keller 
Lorenz Co. v. Insurance Assoc. Corp., 98 Idaho 678,570 P.2d 1366 (1977). 
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other as ifthe principal made the contract personally, subject 
to §§ 6.05-6.09. 
Restatement (Third) Agency, § 6.03. 
hnportantly, the burden of showing that the principal was disclosed before the agreement was 
made is on the party asserting the existence of the agency, i.e., Hom. Marco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Biehl, 97 Idaho 853,858,555 P.2d 393, 398 (1976). See Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp., 
98 Idaho 678, 681, 570 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Idaho 1977) (a party's role as agent is an affirmative 
defense that must be proved by the party asserting the agency). 
The Caravellas asserted in their counterclaim their understanding that they had contracted 
with Hom personally, and not with FDG or any other company. CR. Vol. I, P. 122-35.) Homdidnot 
assert any affirmative defense that he had been acting as an agent for FDG. In Finding of Fact #45, 
the Court wrote: 
Caravellas testified that they believed they were dealing with 
Hom personally, not on behalf of an entity, such as FDG. However, 
Hom testified credibly that his e-mail address and signage at the 
home site provided notice from the start that they were dealing with 
"Frontier Development, LLC dba Open Range Homes." Later, 
Caravellas sent at least five payments to Hom via checks made 
payable to "Frontier Development Group, LLC." 
(R. Vol. I, P. 327.) The district court also found that "even ifCaravellas did not initially know, they 
essentially acquiesced to the arrangement by continuing to make payments directly to FDG, rather 
than to Hom." (Findings #162, p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The district court further found 
that the Caravellas "could have terminated the relationship early on because the project was clearly 
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intended to be divided into separate and distinct phases." (Findings #162, p. 347.) In its 
corresponding Conclusions of Law #59, the district court wrote: 
The names of "Frontier Development Group" and/or "Open Range 
Homes" were present on every correspondence, invoice, and the 
signage at the job site. The Court concludes that there was no 
evidence that Horn attempted to conceal the LLC from Caravellas. 
When Caravellas began making payments, they did so by making 
checks directly payable to FDG or Open Range Homes without 
complaint, reservation, or objection. The Court must conclude that 
Caravellas acquiesced to the fact they were dealing with an entity, and 
not Horn personally. 
(R. Vol. II, P. 359) (emphasis added). 
The district court's findings and conclusions illustrate two related, fundamental errors in the 
its analysis. First, the court appears to have placed the burden of proof on the Caravellas with regard 
to Horn's un-plead affirmative defense. When a party asserts that he is not personally liable because 
he acted only as an agent for a principal, such as a corporation, he bears the burden to prove such 
facts as an affirmative defense. Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 681,570 P.2d 
1366, 1369 (Idaho 1977). Accord, Welch v. Laraway, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041, at 10 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho Sept. 13,2010) (Attached hereto as Addendum 1) ("The party asserting agency as a defense 
to personal liability on a contract bears the burden of showing that the principal was adequately 
disclosed. "). Since the burden of proof was on Horn, not the Caravellas, the lack of evidence that 
Horn attempted to conceal the company's existence is not the evidentiary standard. Rather, Horn 
was required to prove that he made an affirmative effort to disclose the company's existence "at or 
befOre the time of entering into the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975. 
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An official comment to Restatement (Third) Agency § 6.03 explains that it is incumbent on 
the agent to provide sufficient notice of his agency relationship, and it is not a third party's duty to 
discover the principal's existence: 
A principal is undisclosed if, at the time a contract is made, the third 
party with whom the agent deals has no notice that the agent is acting 
on behalf of a principal. It is a question of fact whether the third party 
has received sufficient notice that the contract is made with an agent 
who represents a principal and sufficient notice of that principal's 
identity. The third party is not subject to a duty to discover the 
principal's existence or identity; the responsibility is the agent's if the 
agent wishes to avoid personal liability on the contract. However, a 
third party may have sufficient notice of the principal's existence or 
identity from sources apart from the agent. 
!d. at cmt. 3 (emphases added). 
There was no evidence that Hom made any effort to inform the Caravellas that they were 
dealing with FDG, as opposed to him personally. "[TJhe managing officer of a corporation, even 
though acting for the company, becomes liable as a principal where he deals with one ignorant of 
the company's existence and of his relation to it and fails to inform the latter of the facts." Interlode 
Constructors v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 446-447, 974 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 1999), citing Marco 
Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 97 Idaho 853,858,555 P.2d 393, 398 (1976). "It is a basic principle that 
an agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a corporation, but who neither discloses his agency 
nor the existence ofthe corporation to the third party, becomes personally liable to that third party." 
!d., citing McCluskey Commisary, Inc., 96 Idaho at 93,524 P.2d at 1065. Hom's failure to produce 
evidence of any affirmative disclosure to the Caravellas that he was acting as an agent for FDG, as 
well as the lack of any evidence that the Caravellas were actually aware of such fact, requires a 
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conclusion that Hom should be treated as a party to the construction contract, and is therefore liable 
for his and FDG's breach ofthe contract. 
The second error in the court's findings and conclusions is that the identification of Frontier 
Development Group, LLC, on the invoices after work had begun, cured the prior non-disclosure and 
relieved Hom from all liability. The authorities are clear, however, that in order to avoid liability, 
an agent for a principal must disclose the identity of the principal "at or befOre the time of entering 
into the contract." Western Seeds, 109 Idaho at 71, 704 P.2d at 975. Since the invoices paid by the 
Caravellas obviously were delivered only after the fact, they cannot serve as a basis for relieving 
Hom from liability. 
The Court's reference to the parties' intention that the construction be performed in "separate 
and distinct phases," thus allowing the Caravellas to terminate the relationship early in the project, 
(Findings # 162, p. 347), fails to account for the fact that Hom never actually completed even the first 
phase of the construction. Even if the contract is divisible by phases, Hom would be personally 
liable for at least the first phase. In this particular instance, all of the Caravellas' damages flow from 
Hom's performance, or failure of performance, with regard to the first phase. Thus, even under the 
district court's reasoning, Hom should be found liable. 
Hom admitted in his testimony that except for a single face-to-face meeting with the 
Caravellas at the Property before they purchased the Home, all of their communications prior to 
beginning work on the contract were done through email. (Tr. VoL I, P. 402, L. 12-21.) None of 
the numerous emails make any reference to FDG. (See generally, Defendants' Exhibits A through 
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E, and H through N.) The only connection to FDG is the inclusion of its trade name in the domain 
portion ofthe email address: .. builder@openrangehomes.com ... The district court's reliance on the 
email domain name should not stand as sufficient evidence to establish notice that a person using 
such email address is acting as an agent. Otherwise, it could be presumed that anyone receiving an 
email from a person using an "msn.com" email address.or .. cableone.net ..... yahoo.com ... or other 
common email domain names, is on notice that the person sending the email is an agent for 
Microsoft, Cable One, or Yahoo. Certainly, there are many, many domain names less familiar than 
those listed. Obviously, the vast majority of such users have no agency relationship with those 
companies. It is unreasonable and overly burdensome to charge an email recipient with knowledge 
or a duty to distinguish between actual agents and other users of an email domain name, and is 
inconsistent with the general principles cited above that place the burden of disclosure on the agent. 
It is unreasonable to. 
Regarding the in-person visit, Hom did not present any evidence that he affirmatively 
disclosed that he was acting on behalf of any company rather than himself, although he testified that 
there were signs on the Property identifying "Open Range Homes" as the builder. (Tr. Vol. I, P. 235-
237.) There was no evidence, however, regarding where the sign was placed, how big it was, or 
whether it was even legible after purportedly being in place for nearly two years. (Id.) The 
Caravellas testified that they did not see the sign. (Findings #45, p. 327.) 
In Welch, the plaintiffs had contacted a general contractor, Laraway, about building a home 
for them. 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3041, at 2. The written construction contract identified the 
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contracting builder as "Diamond Ridge Construction," Laraway's company. Attached to the contract 
were plans and specifications prepared by "Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc." Id. When both 
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., and Laraway, individually, filed bankruptcy, the plaintiff 
homeowners brought an action in bankruptcy court against Laraway for personal liability arising 
from alleged breaches of the construction contract. Judge Meyers concluded that the reference to 
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., in the plans and specifications was insufficient to establish 
adequate notice to the homeowners. Id. at 11-12. The court explained: "The burden was on Laraway 
to conspicuously inform the We1ches that the contracting party was Diamond Ridge Construction, 
Inc. ifhe desired to invoke the liability protections afforded by the corporate structure." Id. at 12, 
citing Interlode Constructors, 132 Idaho 443,974 P.2d at 92-93. 
The court in Welch also considered evidence found outside the construction contract, 
including a "Client Introduction Packet," which referenced the company, given to the homeowners 
at their first meeting, and a contractors' license hanging on the wall of Laraway's office, but there 
was no evidence that the homeowners actually saw or understood those references to the company. 
The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish notice that the contracting party 
was the corporation: "The onus was on Laraway to clearly indicate to the We1ches, before or at the 
time of the Contract, that he was acting as the agent of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc .... His 
failure to do so left him exposed to personal liability on the Contract. Id.at 12-13, citing Interlode 
Constructors, 132 Idaho 443, 974 P.2d at 92-93. 
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This case is strikingly similar to Welch. There is no evidence that Hom affirmatively 
informed the Caravellas that he was acting for FDG. The only evidence from which the Caravellas 
possibly could have inferred that Hom was acting for FDG was the purported sign and the last half 
of Hom's email address. The Caravellas testified that they did not see the sign, and there is no 
evidence that the email domain name was noticed by the Caravellas or that they comprehended Hom 
was acting on behalf of "Open Range Homes," before work began on the project. There is no 
material difference between the signs and references to the company in Welch, and the claimed sign 
and email address in this case. Parroting, Judge Meyers, "The onus was on [Hom] to clearly indicate 
to the [Caravellas], before or at the time ofthe Contract, that he was acting as the agent of "Frontier 
Development Group, LLC." Hom should therefore be held personally liable on the contract. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT FDG WAS AN 
"ALTER EGO" OF HORN AND "PIERCED THE CORPORATE VEIL" 
The district court found that Hom "may not have rigorously followed all formalities one 
working through an entity should generally follow," but concluded that "his conduct was sufficient 
to merit the protection afforded to the participants in a limited liability company." (Findings #163, 
p. 347; Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The district court reasoned that "[a]1though Hom had complete 
control over the actions and finances ofFDG, and treated its profits as his own personal income, this 
alone does not invalidate the LLC." (Conclusions #59, p. 359.) The only facts relied upon by the 
court in support of its conclusion that Hom should not be held personally liable were Hom's 
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unsupported testimony that FDG owned two forklifts6 during the Caravella project and that the 
corporate or assumed business names were on signage, correspondence and invoices. (Id.) 
"It is the general rule that the conditions under which a corporate entity may be disregarded 
vary according to the circumstances of each case." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, 
95 Idaho 599, 601,514 P.2d 594, 596 (1973). In order for a corporation to be an alter ego of an 
individual, there must be (1) "a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the separate 
personalities ofthe corporation and individual no longer exist" and (2) "ifthe acts are treated as acts 
of the corporation an inequitable result would follow" or would "sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 
P.3d 261,271 (2007); Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,616 (2005); Sirius LC v. Erickson, 
150 Idaho 80, 85,244 P.3d 224, 229 (2010). 
The Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, enacted in 2008, is based on the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("RULLCA"). Idaho Code § 30-6-101. The Caravellas 
recognize that Idaho § Code 30-6-304(2) specifically relieves LLCs from the requirementto "observe 
any particular formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its activities" in 
order to avoid "imposing liability on the members or managers for the debts, obligations or other 
6 Hom did not identify any other FDG assets in his testimony at trial. (Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, 
L. 24 through P. 911, L. 10.) In Hom's deposition testimony, admitted into evidence as Exhibit 
DDDD, he claimed that FDG owned only one forklift, not two, and no other assets. (Exhibit 
DDDD, Hom Deposition, P. 230, L. 11-19.) 
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liabilities of the company." ld. However, the statute eliminates only one of the factors in the 
"piercing" analysis with regard to LLCs. 
Even though corporate formalities are not required, the members of an LLC must still 
maintain the company's separate economic identity. The official comment for subsection (b) of the 
RULLCA- subsection (2) in Idaho Code § 30-6-304-- explains that "[t]he doctrine of 'piercing 
the corporate veil' is well-established, and courts regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply 
that doctrine to limited liability companies." Idaho Code § 30-6-304(2), official cmt. to subsection 
(b) [(2)] (2008) (emphases added). "This subsection does not preclude consideration of another 
key piercing factor -- disregard by an entity's owners ofthe entity's economic separateness from 
the owners." ld. The official comment provided the following example: 
EXAMPLE: The sole owner of a limited liability company 
uses a car titled in the company's name for personal purposes and 
writes checks on the company's account to pay for personal expenses. 
These facts are relevant to a piercing claim; they pertain to economic 
separateness, not subsection (b) [(2)] formalities. 
The district court expressly found, based on Horn's admissions at trial, that "FDG acts only 
through him, never hired any employees, did not own any assets at the time of trial, and that all of 
FDG's profits were taken by him as his personal income, although he does not receive any 
compensation as a manager or employee of FDG." (Findings #157, p. 346.) In his testimony, Horn 
explained: 
A- At the time of this project, Frontier Development Group was 50 
percent to my wife, Kathleen Horn, and 50 percent to myself. 
Q- Did she have any involvement --
38 
A- Absolutely none. 
Q- Did you pay yourself as the managing member from Frontier 
Development? 
A- I did not receive a salary per se. You'd have to clarify your 
question. 
Q- How did you -- did you cut separate checks from Frontier 
Development to pay yourself or did you just take dividends or how 
did you accomplish it? 
A- I didn't really take an income out ofthe company itself. It was just 
income coming in and then -- no, I didn't pay myself out of Frontier 
Development Group, no. 
Q- So you didn't cut a separate managing member's salary or 
anything like that? It's just whatever money came in and was left over 
at the end you -- was your income? 
A- Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. II, P. 910, L. 1-23) (emphasis added). Hom further testified that the only way Frontier 
Development could act was through him. (Tr. Vol. IT, P. 912, L. 16-18; P. 913, L. 1-3.) 
The Caravellas submit that Hom' s absolute control over FDG, combined with treating FDG's 
income as his own personal income demonstrates a unity of interest sufficient to satisfy the first 
element of the alter ego analysis. While he did not write checks from the business account to pay 
for personal expenses, he also admitted that FDG did not give him any paychecks or dividends. The 
money simply was his to use. There simply is no material difference between spending a company's 
money using its checkbook and spending the company's cash for personal uses. See Idaho Code § 
30-6-304(2), official cmt. to subsection (b) [(2)] (2008) (quoted above). 
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Under-capitalization is another influencing factor in the "piercing" analysis. Ross v. Coleman 
Co., 114 Idaho 817,845, 761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988). Considering the fact that HornlFDG was 
engaged in the business of building large, high-end homes worth well over a million dollars each, 
it cannot be reasonably concluded that ownership of one or, at most, two forklifts is adequate 
capitalization of the company. Indeed, there was no evidence regarding the age, type, size or value 
of the forklifts. Caravellas respectfully submit that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
district court's conclusion that FDG's assets were adequate capital under the circumstances to avoid 
piercing the corporate veil. 
The district court concluded that "[t]he fact that Hom has now allegedly left FDG with no 
means of satisfying a judgment against it does create serious equitable concerns for the Court .... " 
(Conclusions #60, p. 359) (emphasis added). This appears to be a conclusion that the second prong 
of the alter ego analysis was satisfied. In addition, all of the acts for which FDG has been held liable 
to the Caravellas were undertaken by, or under the direction and control of Hom. Hom operated 
FDG in such a reckless manner that he wholly ignored the actual contracts he had made with the 
Caravellas, and earlier with Myers/First Horizon. Hom was the person who misrepresented material 
facts to the Caravellas about the quality, value and condition of the Home, about the progress of the 
work, and who overbilled the Caravellas well in excess of both the contract price and the work 
actually completed. Hom was the person who wrongfully filed the mechanics lien for which the 
Caravellas were awarded substantial damages. Hom took the company's profits as his own income, 
and it is only fitting that he should also take the company's losses and liabilities as his own as well. 
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Certainly, in inequitable result, which would "sanction a fraud or promote injustice," Maroun, 141 
Idaho at 616, will follow if Hom is allowed to engage in such damaging behavior and be allowed 
to hide behind such a thin corporate veil. 
As for the Caravellas' subsequent knowledge regarding their dealings with FDG, rather than 
Hom personally, such knowledge is immaterial to the "piercing" analysis. The case law certainly 
does not deny a "piercing" claim simply because the parties were aware that they were dealing with 
an LLC. Moreover, the Caravellas submit that the Court's finding that the Caravellas should have 
known they were dealing with an LLC is erroneous, as it is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The "piercing" analysis accounts for Horn's actions or inactions in operating his company, not the 
extent of the Caravellas' knowledge of the company's existence. 
In Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 293-294, 688 P .2d 
1191, 1198-99 (Ct. App. 1984), the Court of Appeals reviewed and remanded a district court's 
conclusion that a majority shareholder was not liable as an alter ego. The Court of Appeals' 
reasoning demonstrates that facts very similar to Hom's actions are sufficient to establish liability 
as an alter ego: 
As to the [unity of interest] requirement, we believe there is ample, 
undisputed evidence demonstrating unity of interest and ownership. 
For example, Ryan's own affidavit dated August 22, 1979 repeatedly 
refers to transactions entered into between himself and DCI as if 
Clarendon and he were one and the same personality. Also, the 
counterclaim of Clarendon and Walker, asserting Clarendon's right to 
recover from DCI on certain agreements, makes repeated references 
to agreements actually entered into by DCI and Ryan. It is in respect 
to these same agreements that DCI contends Clarendon was but the 
alter ego of Ryan. Ryan's deposition is part of the record here. In it, 
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Ryan was asked about his ownership of Clarendon stock and when he 
became a director or officer. He stated, "I always had power of 
attorney on everyone and was the major shareholder and the 
managing director at all times of this project. So let's get it on the 
record, I was the boss." Throughout his deposition Ryan consistently 
takes the position that he owns the real estate standing in Clarendon's 
name. We are of the opinion that there is sufficient, undisputed 
evidence in the record showing a complete unity of interest and 
ownership between Ryan and Clarendon, eradicating their separate 
personalities so far as the transactions here are concerned. As to the 
[inequitable result] requirement, we further hold that to treat Ryan's 
promises and agreements in respect to the purchases here involved as 
if they were not binding on Clarendon would result in the injustice of 
forcing the district court to provide only partial, ineffectual relief and 
would greatly extend the litigation necessary to resolve the important 
issues in this dispute, exalting form over substance. 
Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,293-294,688 P.2d 1191, 
1198-99 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Hom was in complete and sole control ofFDG. Hom acted as though he personally owned 
all ofFDG's income. In all of Hom's interactions with the Caravellas, particularly before they hired 
him to complete the construction of the Home, he referred to himself as the one who built the homes, 
hired cabinet makers, designed interiors and who would complete the work for them. Hom made 
no reference to FDG until he sent them a billing statement. As a practical matter, FDG the company 
did nothing for the Caravellas, and was incapable of doing anything for them, except send them a 
bill. 
Caravellas respectfully ask this Court to conclude that FDG is the alter ego of Hom, and 
Hom is therefore liable for the judgment entered against FDG. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
In this appeal, the Caravellas needed only to demonstrate that the district court's express 
findings of fact should have led to and support the conclusion that Hom knew his representations 
to the Caravellas were false or that he made such misrepresentations in ignorance of the actual truth. 
All the other elements of fraud were found by the district court, and such conclusions have not been 
challenged on appeal. The Caravellas submit that the express findings offact, as well as additional 
supporting evidence, demonstrate Hom's knowledge of his misrepresentations and/or his ignorance 
ofthe actual truth. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Hom is not liable for fraud should 
be reversed, and damages awarded to the Caravellas. 
Further, the evidence demonstrates that Hom entered into the contract without making any 
effort to disclose to the Caravellas that he was acting on behalf of anyone but himself. As an agent 
for an undisclosed principal, Hom is liable for breach of contract to the same extent as the principaL 
Therefore, Hom is liable to the Caravellas for all their breach of contract damages, and consequently, 
for their attorney fees. Finally, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Hom treated FDG as his alter 
ego, and should be personally liable for all of FDG's debts and liabilities to the Caravellas. The 
district court's failure to find Hom personally liable should be reversed and a Judgment entered 
against Hom personally for all damages, attorney fees and costs awarded against FDG. 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
ItURODUCTION 
Wendell and Linda Welch (the "Welches") initiated 
this adversary proceeding against Lawrence Christopher 
Laraway, Jr. ("Laraway"), a chapter 7 debtor, to obtain a 
judgment rendering certain claims they allege {fly hold 
against Laraway nondiscilargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). 
I Tbe matter was tried before the Court on July 21 and 
2010, at which time the parties presented evidence 
and offered argument. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
Court took the § 523(a)(2}(A) issues under advisement. ' 
Having considered the record, arguments, and applicable 
authorities, the Comi issues this memorandum of 
decision setting forth its fmdings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw. Fed. R. Bank,.. P. 7052. 
Unless othenvise indicated, aU statutory 
citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title J 1 
U.S. Code, §§ 101-1532. 
2 While both the Welches' Complaint, Doc. No. 
1, and Coversheet, Doc. 
No.2, refer to §§ 523 and 727, neither (*2] 
the facts in the Complaint nor the 
tlresented at trial a denial of 
under § 727. Consequently, the 
Court treats the Welches' claims as 
under § 523(a)(1)(A,). 
FACTS 
In 2006, the Welches decide{f to build a new home. 
They acquired a parcel of prope!1y in Boise, Idaho and 
contacted Laraway, a general contractor, to discuss 
construction. On 18, 2006, the Welches 
entered into a construction contract with "Diamond 
Ridge Coustruction," Laraway's company, to build their 
new residence. Ex. I 00 ("Contract"). Attached to the 
four-page Contract wefe plans and specifications 
prepared by "Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc. H See 
Exs. 100 and 101. Contained within the construction 
plans and specifications were several "allowances" of 
varying amounts, including a "Fiberglass Pool &. 
allowance of $30,000. Based on the plans and 
specifications, calculated, and the Welches 
agreed to pay, a total contract bid of $484,500 for 
the project, subject to certain potential increases provided 
for in the Contract. ' 
3 TIlese incfeases included increased material 
costs beyond the contractor's control as weIl as 
any increased costs associated [*31 with changes 
requested by the Welches. These increased costs 
became a source of dispute between Laraway and 
the Welches over the life oftIle project. 
TIle Contract required the Welches to secure a loan 
commitment or show proof of financing shortly after 
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execution. See Ex. 100. On or about December 21,2006, 
the Welches entered il1to a "one time closing" loan 
agreement with First Horizon Home Loan Corporation 
("First Horizon"). The loan tenns called for periodic 
disbursements or "draws," totaling $484,500, as stages of 
work were completed on tbe residence. 
The Welches took six draws against the loan, 
totaling $454,500, between January 10 and July 20, 
2007. For each draw made the Welches submitted a 
"Draw Request Fonn" ("Request Form") and an 
accompanying "All Bills Paid Affidavit" ("Affidavit") to 
First Horizon. See Ex. I 08. The Request Fonns specified 
the amount of funds to be drawn and were accompanied 
by an "Itemized Draw Fonn" ("Itemized Fonn") that 
identified the line item expenses (e.g., plumbing, 
electrical, roofmg) to which the disbursed funds would 
be applied. The Request Forms, Itemized Fonns, and 
Affidavits were all signed by Laraway, on behalf of 
Diamond Ridge Construction, [*4] and either Wendell 
or Linda Welch. 4 See Exs. 106, 107, and 218·223. 
4 Where reference to only one ofthe Welches is 
required, the Court will refer to "Wendell" or 
"Linda." 
Both the Request Fonn and the Affidavit contained 
celtifications by Laraway and the Welches that disbursed 
funds were being applied to pay for labor and materials 
used in the construction of the Welches' home. TIle 
Request Faml provided: 
General Contractor/Builder and 
Bon'ower state that all of the funds that 
are requested in this "Draw Request" will 
be used to pay for the labor and materials 
which created the improvements to the 
subject property. General 
Contractor/Builder and Bon'ower fm1her 
state that all funds advanced before the 
date of this request (if any) were also used 
to pay for labor and materials for the 
improvements of the subject property. 
Ex. 218 (emphasis added). The Affidavit contained a 
similar, yet slightly different, statement: 
Contractor and Owner state that all of 
the funds that Lender has advanced before 
the date of this Affidavit (if any), have 
been used to pay for labor and materials, 
which have created the improvements on 
the Property. Contractor and Owner state 
that there are no disputes with, [*5] or 
debts owed to, any mechanics, material 
men, or subcontractors for the labor or 
materials furnished. There are no security 
interests or liens encumbering the 
Property other than those created in favor 
of Lender. The only exceptions to this 
paragraph are .... 5 
5 No exceptions were listed in any of the 
Affidavits signed and submitted by Laraway and 
the Welches. See Ex 107. 
Ex. 107 (emphasis added). vv'hen considered 
together with the other loan documents presented at trial, 
which indicated that funds would be disbursed only for 
completed work, see Ex. 108, these statements suggest a 
process whereby requested funds were to be used to pay 
outstanding invoices for completed work, as provided for 
in the Itemized Fonns, and Laraway and the Welches 
were to certity through the Affidavits that all debts owed 
to subcontractors, except those to be paid with the draw 
being requested, had been paid. The testimony at trial 
supp0l1s this reading. In particular, the Welches testified 
that their understanding was that the line items identified 
in the Itemized Fonns represented the outstanding 
expenses that would be paid with the disbursed funds. 
Similarly, Laraway testified that he signed the Affidavits 
[*6] to indicate that the subcontractors "would be" paid 
with the disbursed funds according to the cost breakdown 
in the Itemized Fonns. 
Work on the Welches' residence stopped in July 
2007 after disagreements arose between Laraway and the 
Welches conceming responsibility for increased costs 
that had accumulated over the course of the project. 
These additional expenses stemmed from ce11ain changes 
requested by the Welches as well as overages on 
previously budgeted items. At the time, the home was 
complete except for instaIIation of the pool and spa, for 
which $30,000 was still available under the loan, and 
some landscaping and other minor work. 
Amid this disagreement, the Welches discovered 
that some of the subcontractors had not been paid. Tn the 
fall of 2007, three ofthe unpaid subcontractors recorded 
claims of lien against the Welches' residence -- The 
Stucco Company, Inc. ("Stucco") for $31,420,4 Seasons 
Heating and Cooling, Inc. ("4 Seasons") for $4,318.99, 6 
and Myers Enterprises, Inc. ("Myers Enterprises") for 
$18,500. Exs. 112-114. 7 Another subcontractor, 
Advanced Marble and Granite ("Advanced Marble"), 
filed a small claims action against Laraway and the 
Welches for $9,924.50. Ultimately, [*7] the Welches 
paid Stucco $19,000 and 4 Seasons $3,810 to settle their 
liens. S Wendell Welch testified that the Myers 
Enterprises lien no longer encumbers their property, 
though he provided no fu11her explanation conceming 
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resolution of the lien. He fU11her testified that Advanced 
Marble dismissed their claim against the Welches after 
Wendell presented the Itemized Fonn showing Diamond 
Ridge Construction had received payment for Advanced 
Marble's materials and labor. 
6 The 4 Seasons claim of lien included $3,810 
for labor and materials plus $144.78 in interest, 
$14.21 in costs, and $350 in attomey's fees, for a 
total claim of$4,318.99. 
7 The Welches testified that Diamond Ridge 
Construction also filed a claim of lien on their 
property. 
8 The Welches were able to negotiate a lower 
payment to Stucco based on their assertion that 
Stucco's work on their home was substandard and 
had resulted in approximately $10,000 in 
damages. 
On July 8, 2008, Laraway caused Diamond Ridge 
Construction, Inc. to file a voluntary petition for chapter 
7 relief. Approximately one year later, on June 25, 2009, 
Laraway filed an individual chapter 7 petition. • The 
Welches initiated this adversary proceeding to have [*8] 
their claims against Laraway, personally, declared 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). 
9 TIle Court takes judicial notice of the filings of 
record in both Diamond Ridge Constl1Jction's 
corporate bankruptcy, Case No. 08-01342-TLM, 
and Laraway's personal bankruptcy, Case No. 09-
01831-TLM. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Laraway's 
personal bankruptcy case remains open, although 
the chapter 7 trustee has filed a report of no 
distlibution. Diamond Ridge Construction's 
bankruptcy case was closed as a no asset case on 
July, 6, 2009. Laraway did not schedule as an 
asset in either the corporate case or her personal 
case, any debt claimed to be owed by the 
Welches. 
DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION 
A. Personal liability 
Laraway asserts that even if the Court were to find 
his conduct fraudulent, he was acting at aIt times on 
behalf of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., a 
corporation, in his interactions with the Welches. Thus, 
he contends, any debt owed the Welches arising out of 
that relationship is a corporate, rather than personal, debt. 
TIle Welches argue that Laraway was doing business 
with them not through his corporation, but instead 
personally under his assumed business name of Diamond 
Ridge Construction. 
To [*9] supp0l1 their argument, the Welches point 
to a Certificate of Assumed Business Name of "Diamond 
Ridge Cons1J:uction" for Laraway and his ex-wife , 
Jennifer Laraway, filed with the Idaho SecretalY of State 
on April 30, 2001, Ex. 105, and emphasize that the 
Contract and loan documents identify only "Diamond 
Ridge Construction," not "Diamond Ridge Construction, 
Inc. ," as the general contractor. In response, Laraway 
testified that shortly after obtaining the Certificate of 
Assumed Business Name he incorporated the business, 
but never took any action to cancel the Certificate as he 
was unaware that such action was necessary. 10 To 
corroborate his testimony, Laraway introduced a copy of 
the Articles of Incorporation for Diamond Ridge 
Construction, Inc., filed with the Idaho Secretary of State 
on June 28, 200 I. Ex. 200. 
lO A certificate of assumed business name filed 
with the Secretary of State remains in effect until 
the filing of a certificate of cancellation. Idaho 
Code §§ 53-506(2), 53-508. 
It js weU established that a person coritracting with 
another as an gent IS liable as apart}' tQ the contract 
unl ss he discloses, torbeforelh ri e of entering into 
the contract the a ency relationship 1· i 0] and the 
Identity oflhe princip I Se, TTl d Letising,&Fflt., Inc . . v. 
Rocky Mountain Rogu~. In . /481c/aho 503, 224 P 3d 
1091. J096 (ldoho 1009); w. &ds, I nc. v. BCVfll, 109 
Idaho 70, 70/ P 2d 97/,975. (Idaho App 1985). The 
party asserting agency as a defense to personal liabilily 
on a con ct bears the burden of showing th ( the 
principal was adequately disclosed. Kellttr Loren: Co. ·v. 
Ins. A socs Corp., 98 Maho 678. 570 P.ld /J66. /J69 
(Idaho 1977) (deeming agency defense 10 personal 
contrac.t lillbilityan affirm Ii e defense for purposes of 
Rid· 8(c) oflheldaho Rules of Civil pr~edure). 
The Court finds that [he ContraCt ilSel,. did not 
adequately disclose Ihal Lara '3y was acting as the a enl 
of Diamond Ridge C nstrucrion Inc. At ' best the 
ontra¢tis ambiguo as to the identity of the contractor. 
Had the Contract indicated Laraway was signing in a 
repent live c ity on behalf of Diamond · Ridge 
Construclion. Inc., " there woul be no ambiguity nd 
Laraway 'ould have no personal liability Wlder t~'e 
Contract. Se Triad UQ ing. lU P.ld at 1096. Howe er, 
~he Can ct was not so executed and the description of 
lhe conlractin party . states "Diamond Ride 
Construction- , ithno Mlne.N or otherindicatio .of 
corporate [·'1] structure. Though the Contract refers ·10 
"Diamond Ridge Construction, , c."·aS .tJle author of the 
attached building specifications, lhat single reference is 
insufficient to overcome the ambiguitie from the manner 
cif e. ecution and tJle Contnict pta ision identifying 
"Di mond Ridge COl1$lrUction" as the general contnlcto . 
See E;( 100. 
11 Such an executior'l would in substance read: 
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"Diamond Ridge Construction, . Inc., by Lawrence 
Christopller Laraway, Jr" President." The 
Contract here was executed: "Contractor's 
Signature," foflowedby Laraway's signature. 
Laraway also contends tha~ the footer on the 
building specifications, 'Nhid~ provides "Registered 
rdaho Conti-actot RCE-3105," supports his position that 
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc.· was the contracting 
party because "RCE·3105" was contractor 
registration number assigned to Diamond Ridge 
Construction, Jnc, See E.. 202. 12 The 'Court is 
un ' '. rs ded. Wendell testified that when he signedlhe 
Contract he ,'as un wate that the footer ref! rre.d to the 
tonlrattregistralion nw be " of DiamoncfRid e 
Construction, In.c. It .' as not the . Welchcs'burden to 
inquirefunher as to the meaning of n abstruse footer. in 
the buildingpecificalions ched [·11) 10 the 
Contract e burden was on La way to conspiCuously 
infonn the Welches th t the contracting p rty\\' 
Diamond Rjdge Construction. fnc. ir be desired to in. 0 e 
the liabi lity protections affo(dedby the corpOI'ate 
structure. See Infer/odeConslrocfor.r, bre. v. Br),onf; 132 
fdaho443, 9 4 P.ld 89, 9i-"93 (Idaho pp. 1 999). 
12 Under Idaho law, any person engaged in the 
business of, or holding himself out to be, a 
contractor must be registered with the State of 
Idaho Contractors Board. See Idaho Code § 54-
5204. 
In sum, the Contract, on its face, did not adequately 
disclose that Laraway was acting as the agent of 
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc. 
H8 ing follnd the Contract iri~dequate forpurpo~es 
of disclosing Diamon'Ci Ridge Connruclion. Inc . . as 
Laraway's principaJ, the Court looks to evidence outside 
the Con ct to determine , helher such a disclosure 
oc.cum:d. Laraway asse$ that hi initial meeting with 
the. Welches ~hould h ve made clear to Ihm! th t they 
w;ei'e d " lin .\ ilh Diamond Ridge onstruction, Inc. 
S~cific8I1y. Laraway testified th t t Ihe initial meetin 
he \,"ould he given the Welche 8 "Client Introduction 
Packet." Ex. No. 212. which references Diamond Ridge 
CO~$tnJctio • Inc. Lara vay further [· '3] testified t 
there was a franled c pyof Diamond Ridge 
Construction. Inc.'s con ctor Iicen~ . 202, hanging 
oii the wall in the. office '~here he met \ ith the Welches. 
TIle Cqurt tiridsthallhe "Client lntroductiori P c etl! 
and the presence of the coo clor's Iiccn e in Laraw y's 
oJfictdid Dot ufficiently disclc) 10 tbe Welches that 
Lanl\vay \ ' gcling as t'he agent ' of Diamond Ridge 
Construction, Inc. At trial, Wendell did 110t recall 
receiving the "Clienl Introduction Packet," and e 'en if 
the Welches had received such a packet t.here was no 
evidence lh t they ' re d it; ,or thalhey would Jiave 
understood it to mean they werecpntr2ctirig with 
Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc., not Laraway. 
Wendell further testified that he never noticed the 
contractor's license on the wall of Laraway's office. The 
ontis was 0'11 Laraway to clearly indicate to the Welches, 
before orat the time of the Contract, that he was acting 
as the agent of Diamond Ridge Construction, Inc. See 
biterlode ConstruCtors, 974 P.2d at 92-93. His failure to 
do so left him exposed to personal liability on the 
Contract. 
Laraway's personal liability under the Contract does 
not end the analysis. While the Couit fulds that Laraway 
[*14] was a party to the Contract for purposes of contract 
liability, liabilities excepted from discharge under § 
523(a)(2)(A), such as those alleged here, sound in fi:aud, 
not contract. 
Corporate d' . ctors and offite.rs may not be held 
liable. fOT fraud or . er t l1ious \ ongdoing committed 
by the corporal ion or its officers merely by virtue of their 
office. LB. Indus., Iflc. v. Smi,h, 8/7. F.2d 69,71 (9,,, 
Cir .. 198). However; .a corporate director or officer.m y 
beheld Iiable~f . he speciti lIy . directs, actively 
partlcip tes in, or knowingly 8cquie$Ccs in the fraud or 
other\\Tongdolng of the corp liolior its officers. ld.; 
see,i/soSe Bell v. Smith (In rlf SmiTh) 98.4 I.8.C.R. 
119. 110 (B . 0 Idaho 1998); N~/son Post Falls 
luzda ('n re Nelson). 150 BR. 9U. 9}5-26 (8onkr. D . 
Idaho 1993); fit rt! H01rltins, 144 B.R. ./8/, ' .f8.J.:85 
(Banh-. D. Idaho 1991). 
The evidence ~stablishes Laraway as an active 
participant in dealing with the Welches -- be negotiated 
Ihe Con ct, signed it and all the Itemized Fonns nd 
Affidavits. and was r nsible for ensuring pa}1nent of 
the . subcontractors from the disbursed funds..H~ \vas 
directly involved in e ery aspect of the project, was 
the only corporate [- IS] ome« involved in ens ring 
Diamond Ridge COllstructio properly perfonned.TIlus 
way may be held personally liable Und § 
5~J(Q)( ~(.-I) to the e. tent the Welches' allegationS .that 
theY"ere defr8uded ate proven true. This con.cll,lSion 
Will rest on evidence of LarawaY's conduct, . imspec~ive 
ofany persollal liability he on tMContract n 
13 Because of this required focus on Laraway's 
conduct, the COUIt will refer to his acts in the 
following discussion. 
B. Sectioll 523(a)(2)(A) 
This is not the frrst time the Court has been tasked 
with considering § 523(a)(2)(A) claims in the context of 
a residential construction project. See. e.g., Mire v. 
Ankersmit (In re Allkersmit), 03.1 LB.C.R. 71 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho 2003) (finding plaintiffs failed to prove all of § 
523(a)(2)(A) elements with respect to debtor contractor's 
failure to pay subcontractors Wl10 worked Oll plaintiffs' 
home); Bell V. Smith (111 re Smith), 232 B.R. 461 (Bal1kr. 
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D. Idaho 1998) (concluding contractor's debts arising 
fi'om claims of lien against plaintiffs' homes were 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Custer v. Dobbs 
(In re Dobbs), 115 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) 
(same). 
Section 523(a)(2)(4) excepts from discharge any 
[*16] debt "for money, property, services, or an 
extension, renewal, or refInancing of credit, to the extent 
obtained by -- false pretenses, a false representation, or 
actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the 
debtor's or an insider's fInancial condition." To prevail on 
a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) a plaintiff mllst prove the 
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) misrepresentation, fi'audulent omission, or deceptive 
conduct by the debtor in obtaining money, property, 
services Of credit; (2) debtor's knowledge ofthe falsity or 
deceptiveness ofllis statement or conduct; (3) an intent to 
deceive; (4) justifiable reliance by the creditor 011 the 
debtor's statement or conduct; and (5) damage to the 
creditor proximately caused by its reliance on the 
debtor's statement or conduct. Fetty v. DL Carlson 
Enterprises, Inc. (In re Carlson), 426 B,R. 840, 854 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) (citing Ninth Circuit authorities). 
In applying exceptions to discharge, the COUlt must 
construe § 523(a)(2)(A) strictly against the creditor and 
liberally in favor of the debtor so as to avoid reading the 
statute more broadly than necessmy to effectuate th.e 
policy of preventing debtors fi'om avoiding [*17] debts 
lllcUlTed by fraud or other culpable conduct Id. 
1. False representations 
The Welches identify three representations or groups 
of representations made by Laraway that they allege 
constitute false representations. 
a. The pool and spa allowance 
The first is the provision in the building plans and 
specifications establishing a $30,000 "allowance" for the 
purchase and installation of a pool and spa. The Welches 
claim the pool mld spa allowance provision was a 
promissOlY representation that the pool and spa they 
requested would be purchased and installed for $30,000. 
They further contend that at the time Laraway made this 
promise, he knew he could not obtain and install both the 
pool and spa for $30,000. 
A promise made without a present intent to perf 01111 
satisfIes § 523(a)(2)(A), as does a representation which 
the debtor knew or should have known was outside of the 
debtor's prospective ability to perfonn. Smith, 98.4 
I.B.CR. at 121 (quoting McCrary v. Barrack (In re 
Barrack), 217 B.R. 598,606 (9th Cit. BAP 1998)). 
Laraway knew or should have known he would be 
unable to provide and install the pool and spa for 
$30,000, Laraway testified that the pool and spa 
allowance in the Contract was ["18] derived from a 
2006 installation list he received fi'om Viking Pools, Ex. 
214.'4 Therein, installation ofa "Cannel" pool (the type 
called for in the Welches' building plans) was listed 
between $29,020 and $38,552. 15 The least expensive spa 
was listed at $12,095, Consequently, the Viking Pools 
list would have dictated a minimum bid or estinlate of 
$41,115 (i.e., $29,020 + $12,095), more than $11,000 
above the $30,000 pool and spa allowance Laraway 
represented to the Welches. Although Laraway contends 
that the $30,000 figure was merely an estimate, the Court 
fmds his conduct, given the info1111ation upon which he 
based his estimate, to be sufficiently deceptive to satisfY 
the first clement of § 523(a)(2)(A). 16 
14 Laraway never provided the Welches the 
Viking Pools installation list or any other 
documentation to support the pool and spa 
allowance. It was only during this litigation, and 
more specifically when it was introduced by 
Laraway during the trial, that the list surfaced. 
15 The price list offered four possible 
installation packages of varying cost, ranging 
from the least expensive, the "Bronze" package, 
to the most expensive, the "Platinum" package. 
See Ex. 214. 
16 The Welches identified [* 19] other 
provisions III the contract and building plans that 
they also believed to be false representations, 
including a plumbing allowance of $8,000 and a 
roofing estimate of $16,875.06. However, no 
evidence was introduced to show that Laraway 
did not intend to perfonn consistent with those 
estimates, nor is there sufficient evidence to infer 
such an intent. Indeed, the only evidence 
presented was Laraway's testimony that the 
estimates he gave the Welches were based 01] 
bids or estimates he had received from 
subcontractors. 
h. The Affidavits 
The second set of representations identified by the 
Welches are Laraway's serial asseliions in the Affidavits 
that there were no disputes with, 01' debts owed to, any 
mechanics, materialmen, or subcontractors for the Jabor 
or materials fumished in the construction of the Welches' 
residence. Specifically, the Welches contend that these 
representations were false as to Stucco, 4 Seasons, Myers 
Enterprises, and Advanced Marble, as evidenced by the 
claims they eventually asserted against the Welches or 
their property. 11 
17 The COUlt recognizes that in their Complaint, 
the Welches did not asseli the 4 Seasons claim of 
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lien as a basis for Ilondischargeability. [*20] 
Having been ftlll tried by the parties, the COUlt 
treats the issue of the 4 Seasons claim as if raised 
in the pleadings. See Fed R. Bank,.. P. 7015 
(making applicable Fed R. Civ. P. 15(b)) The 
same analysis and conclusion apply to the 
Welches' claim regarding the $3,000 for 
appliances, which was also not pleaded in their 
Complaint. 
The evidence demonstrates that Laraway's 
representations with respect to payment of these 
subcontractors were false. The claims filed by the four 
subcontractors for unpaid invoices belie Laraway's 
assertions in the Affidavits regarding prior payment and 
lack of dispute. In fact, Laraway tcstified that he did not 
know whether all the subcontractors had been paid when 
he signed the Affidavits and that, even at the time of trial, 
he was unsure of who had been paid. Even absent direct 
e~idence of knowing misrepresentation, such reckless 
dIsregard for the truth of a representation satisfies the 
element that the debtor has made an intentionally false 
representation. See, e.g., Arm v. lv/orrison (In re Arm), 
175 B.R. 349, 354 (9th Gr. BAP 1994). 
c. Appliances 
The final representation identified by the Welches is 
the July 20, 2007 Itemized Fonn which allocated $3,000 
[*21] of yet to be disbursed fimds to the purchase of 
appliances for the Welches' new home. The Welches 
testified that no appliances were ever purchased by 
Laraway, and that they were later required to purchase 
the appliances 011 their own. " 
18 As evidence of the appliance purchases the 
Welches presented an invoice and receipt from 
Home Depot for $9,449.06. See Exs. 110 and 
Ill. 
. T.he July 20 Itemized Form does not qualifY as an 
mtentlOnally false representation. As previously noted, 
the understanding between Laraway and the Welches 
was that the disbursed funds would be used to pay the 
expenses identified in the Itemized Fonns. Thus, at most, 
listing the $3,000 for appliances constituted a promise by 
Laraway to use $3,000 of the yet to be disbursed funds to 
buy appliances. 1. While the evidence indicates no 
appliances were ever purchased by Laraway, there is no 
proof that Laraway did not intend to use $3,000 of the 
funds to buy appliances when he fined out and signed the 
Itemized Fonn. Because the Welches failed to sI~ow that 
Laraway did not intend to perform on his promise, their § 
523(a)(2){A) claim as to the appliances representation 
will be dismissed. 
19 Laraway did not sign an Affidavit [*22] 
subsequent to the July 20 draw request, as that 
draw was the last made against the loan. 
Consequently, the only representation made by 
Laraway concerning the appliances was the 
$3,000 allocation in the Itemized Fonll portion of 
the July 20 draw request. 
2. Intent to Deceive 
Not only must there be a representation of material 
fad which is false, the representation must be made with 
the intention and purpose to deceive. Ankersmit, 03.1 
I.B.C.R. at 73. Intent to deceive is a question of fact that 
may be infen'ed fi-om circumstantial evidence. Cowen v. 
Kennedy (In re Kenl1ed)~, 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
TIle Court finds Laraway intended to deceive the 
Welches regarding the S30,000 pool and spa allowance. 
Laraway knew at the time he executed the contract that 
he lacked the ability to provide and install a pool and spa 
to specifications for the amount of $30,000. It is 
reasonable to infer from the whole of this record that his 
purpose in presenting an infeasible allowance was to 
deceive the Welches as to the true cost for the pool and 
spa in order to induce them into signing the contract. 
The Court finds Laraway also intended to deceive 
the Welches when he signed the Affidavits. Laraway 
[*23] testified that he intended to pay the subcontractors 
and suppliers, that alI of the funds advanced to him were 
spent on labor and materials used in the Welches' home 
that he made no profit on construction of the Welche;' 
home, and that any unpaid invoices were solely the result 
of unexpected overages or upgrades the Welches 
requested after construction had begun. He further 
testi~ed that he signed the Affidavits to keep the project 
movmg forward, and planned to pay any unpaid 
subcontractors with the additional funds he expected the 
Welches to cOIltribute for extra costs (those not 
contem~lated by the original plans and budget) that had 
been pmd as construction progressed. 
Several pieces of evidence presented at trial impeacIl 
Laraway's testimony. First, the Itemized Forms submitted 
:vit? each of the Welches' six draw requests, Ex. 106, 
mdlcate that $44,215.88 of the funds disbursed under the 
loan were allocated to "Builder Overhead and Profit" 
contradicting Laraway's testimony that he realized 1;0 
profit on the project. 20 
20 The reliability of the Itemized Fonus 
standing alone, is equivocal. Indeed, the Welche;' 
case is largely premised on the allegation tllat the 
disbursed funds were [*24] not used in the 
manner prescribed by the Itemized Fonns, and 
the evidence, which includes the subcontractor 
claims against the Welches as well as Laraway's 
testinlony, supports this view. Still, Laraway 
never reconciled the documental}' evidence with 
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his assel1ions that no profit was taken. Nor did he 
establish where the money did go ifnot to himself 
or to the unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. 
Second, the "Job Cost Detail" for the Welches' 
residence produced fi'om Diamond Ridae Construction's 
business records, Ex. 225 ("Detail"), ~hen considered 
together with the liens and other claims filed against the 
Vv'el~hes, further contradicts Laraway's testimony. The 
DetaIl, generated August 16, 2007, shows the draws and 
invoices received by Diamond Ridge Construction for 
the Welches' residence. 21 According to the Detail, 
Diamond Ridge Construction received draws totalin<> $45~,500, and invoices totaling $450,724.80, resulting i~ 
a dIfference of $3,775.20. The Detail included invoice 
amounts consistent with the claims asserted by the 
unpaid subcontractors -- i.e., Stucco for $31,420, 4 
Seasons for $3,810, 22 Myers Enterprises for $18,500, and 
Advanced Marble for $9,924.50. Together tIle Detail 
[*25J showing total invoices $3, 775.20 le~s than total 
draws, and the unpaid subcontractors' claims, totaling 
$63,654.50, suggest that at least $67,429.70 of the 
disbursed funds were not used In labor and materials on 
the Welch job. 
21 The Detail does not indicate whether the 
invoices were actually paid. 
22 See supra note 6. 
The liens and related claims asserted against the 
Welches, together with the Itemized Fornls and the 
Detail, support the inference that some of the 
disbursements were diverted to purposes other than 
payment for labor and materials used in the Welches' 
home. No other rational explanation, consistent with the 
documentary evidence, was suggested. Based on this 
evidence and these circumstances, the Court concludes 
that Laraway's statements in the Affidavits that no debts 
were owed to subcontractors were knowingly false and 
made with an intent to deceive the Welches and induce 
them into authorizing further disbursements. 
3. Reliance 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable reliance. 
Smith, 03.1 I.B.CR. at 121 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 
US. 59, 70-71, 116 S. Ct. 437, 133 L. Ed 2d 351 
(1995)). Justifiable reliance is a subjective standard 
which requires the Court to consider the qualities and 
characteristics of [*26] the particular plaintiff, the 
knowledge and relationship of the patties, and all of the 
circumstances surrounding the particular transaction. 
Field, 516 US. at 71; Eugene Parks Law C01p. Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 
1454, 1458-60 (9th Cir. 1992). W11i1e justifiable reliance 
does not require that a creditor investigate the truth of the 
representation in each case, an investigation is required 
"where, under the circumstances, the facts should be 
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence fi'om a 
cursory glance, or he has discovered something which 
should serve as a warning that he is being deceived." 
Smith, 03.1 I.B.C.R. at 122 (quoting Field, 516 Us. at 
71). 
TIle Welches justifiably relied on the $30,000 pool 
and spa allowance in the Contract. They specifically 
requested that the pool and spa be included in the 
building plans before signing the contract, and testified 
that it was a material tenn. 
TIle Welches also justifiably relied on Laraway's 
representations in the Affidavits that all the 
subcontractors had been paid. They relied on the fact that 
outstanding costs were being paid fi:om monies disbursed 
to D~amond Ridge Construction. It was only [*27] after 
all SIX draws had been made against the loan that the 
Welches discovered Laraway had not paid some of the 
subcontractors. There were no circumstances which 
would have served as a waming to the Welches that they 
were being deceived and the subcontractors were going 
unpaid. It is also reasonable for the Court to accept the 
Welches' assertions that, had they known the 
s~bcontractors were not being paid, further 
dIsbursements would have been conditioned or 
suspended pending resolution of any unpaid 
subcontractor bills. 
4. Loss suffered 
The Welches have not shown they were damaged by 
their reliance on the $30,000 pool and spa allowance. 
The $30,000 earmarked for the pool and spa was never 
drawn out from the available loan proceeds, and the 
~elches present~? no evidence to show that they 
1l1curred any addItIOnal cost by canying that amount on 
the loan. Nor did they present evidence of legal fees or 
other costs resulting fi·om reliance on the pool and spa 
al1owance. The Welches bear the burden of proving that 
they were damaged by their reliance on Laraway's 
representation, which they have failed to do. Because the 
W?lches have not proven they were damaged by their 
relIance, they canllot [*28] prevail 011 their § 
523(a}(2}(AJ claim as to the pool and spa allowance. 
The Welches did suffer a financial loss as a direct 
result of their reliance on Laraway's statements in the 
Affidavits. They were forced to pay $22,810 to settle 
claims of lien -- $19,000 to Stucco and $3,810 to 4 
Seasons. While Wendell testified that the Welches also 
lllcun'ed attorney's fees and costs in conjullction with the 
Stucco lien, no evidence was presented regarding the 
amounts of those fees and costs. In the absence of such 
~vidence, the Court lacks the specificity required to 
1l1clude attomey's fees and costs incun'ed by the Welches 
as part .of the damage caused by Laraway's 
representatIOns. See Car/son, 426 B.R. at 858 ("A 
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plaintiff must prove the specific amount of the damage 
caused by the fi'audulent representation."). Consequently, 
the Court finds that the Welches were damaged in the 
amount 0[$22,810. 
C. Setoff 
At trial, Laraway argued that any liability the COUli 
found on his part should be reduced by the $30,000 of 
the $484,500 contract price the Welches never disbursed 
to Diamond Ridge Construction. Laraway's argument is 
in essence one for setoff -- the adjustment of mutual 
debts arising out of separate [*29] transactions between 
the paIties. See SA1F Corp. v. Harmon (In re Harmon), 
188 B.R. 421, 425 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). Z3 To invoke a 
right to setoff there must be mutuality. "Mutuality is 
satisfied when the 'parties have concurrent rights against 
each other.'" In re Lifestyle Furnishings, LLC, 418 B.R. 
382, 386 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (quoting In re Hiplvell, 
97.1 I.B.C.R. 25, 27, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2430, 1997 WL 
34584333, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997)). 
23 The transactions at issue here would be 
"separate" because the $30,000 claim alluded to 
by Laraway is a contract liability, while his debt 
to the Welches sounds in fi·aud. 
Here, there is no mutuality because Laraway holds 
no right against the Welches. As noted previously, the 
Contract and loan documents contemplated payment in 
stages upon the completion of work. The pool and spa 
were never installed. Accordingly, Laraway had no right 
to the $30,000 to be paid out for that work. 
Moreover, even if Laraway had such a right under 
the Contract, that right became part of Laraway's 
bankruptcy estate when he filed his chapter 7 petition. 
See Kaler v. Craig (In re Craig), 144 F.3d 593, 596 (8th 
Cir. 1998) ("A debtor's right to setoff is propeliy of the 
bankruptcy estate.") [*30] (citing 5 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 553.03[7][b] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th 
ed. 1998)). 14 Therefore, the Court concludes that 
Laraway has no right to the remaining $30,000, and those 
fimds are unavailable to Laraway as a means to reduce or 
offset his liability under § 523(a)(2)(A). 
24 Laraway did not schedule a contract claim 
against the Welches in either Diamond Ridge 
Const111ction, Inc's bankruptcy case, Case No. 08-
01342-TLM, or his own personal bankruptcy 
case, Case No. 09-01831-TLM. 
D. Attorney's Fees 
In their Complaint, the Welches request an award for 
attomey's fees incurred in prosecuting this action. To 
recover attorney's fees inculTed in pursuing a § 
523(a)(2)(A) action, a creditor must be able to recover 
the fees outside the bankruptcy court under state or 
federal law. Kilborn v. Hazm ([n re Hal/n), 396 B.R. 522, 
526-27 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (quoting Levitt v. Cook 
(In re Levitt), BAP No. AZ-07-1166, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 
4683 (9th Cir. BAP July 22, 2008)). 
111e Welches request attomey's fees "pursuant to an 
applicable section of the bmh1mIptcy code, common law, 
or to the extent not exempted, state law." First, there is 
no general right to recover attorney's fees under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id at 526. Second, [*31] under Idaho 
law, to recover on a claim for attorney's fees a party must 
asselt in its pleadings the specific statute, rule or case 
authority supporting its claim, lei. at 528 (citing Hopkins 
v. Saratoga Holdings, LIC (In re Colvin), 08.2 IB.CR. 
63, 652008 WL 1957855, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008)). 
The Welches failed to so identify specific authority that 
would entitle them to attorney's fees. Therefore, their 
request for fees is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the reasons set fOlth above, the Court 
frnds that the Welches' have proven the requirements 
necessary under § 523(a)(2)(A) to support ajudgment by 
this COUlt that debts arising fro111 the settlement of claims 
of lien against the Welches' home in the amount of 
$22,810 should be excepted from discharge. 
Counsel for the Welches shall submit an appropriate 
order and fom1 of judgment. 
DATED: September 13,2010 
/s/ Teny L. Myers 
TERRY L. MYERS 
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
